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Acknowledging the Crisis in Social Liberalism:
A Call for a New Approach to Teaching Social Policy
Roger A. Lohmann
West Virginia University

A graduate social policy course at West Virginia University has been
redesigned by a senior faculty member and lead instructor to recognize
advances in political philosophy and to confront the decline of the social
liberal welfare state and the rise of populist radicalism, through civic
engagement by citizen-professionals.

Introduction
First of all, I would like to commend the School of Social Work at the
University of South Carolina for playing host to this historic conference.
Those of us who teach and practice social policy in schools of social work are
accustomed to interacting with our students and our non-policy colleagues
and our communities. However, as I look over the past three decades of my
teaching and work in this area, one of the things that stands out most is the
limited number of opportunities there have been for the kind of collegial
exchange which is occurring here.
My overall purpose in this presentation is to follow up on what I see as the
implications of certain recent work in political philosophy for the teaching of
social policy. Most recent attentions in social work have been focused around
the crisis in liberalism as a practical matter. My primary interest in this
paper is to treat it as an intellectual and theoretical concern. Political
philosophy is a peculiar hybrid – an uneasy mixture of the esoteric concerns
of professional philosophers with the pragmatic concerns of the rest of us
about the basis of our collective life. After several decades of apparently being
completely moribund, something of a renaissance in political philosophy
began in the wake of John Rawls’ celebrated Theory of Justice, first published
in 1971 (Rawls, 1971). My particular approach to both philosophy and policy
is informed in general by Deweyian pragmatism, and in particular by
Benjamin Barber’s criticisms of what he calls ‘the conquest of politics by
philosophy’ (Barber, 1988). My approach is also informed by Theodore Lowi’s
recent suggestion that ours is an age of ideology (Lowi, 1995).
According to Barber (1988), “The historical aim of political theory has
been dialectical or dialogical: The creation of a genuine praxis in which
theory and practice are sublated and reconciled, and the criteria yielded by
common action are permitted to inform and circumscribe philosophy no less
The original version of this paper was presented as Acknowledging the Crisis in Liberalism: A Call
for a New Social Policy at the Faculty Institute on Social Welfare Policy and Services. Charleston
SC. July 19-24, 1998.
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than philosophical criteria are permitted to constrain the understanding of
politics and informed political action.” Barber, like pragmatists in general,
opposes this concern of political philosophy with creating a more authentic
public life to the kind of spectator or grandstand views of political and social
theory which suggest that the philosopher (or social scientist) is somehow
apart from, and in a superior position to political action.
Yet, he says, “in much of what passes for political philosophy in the age of
liberalism, reductionism and what William James called 'vicious
abstractionism' has too often displaced dialectics and dialogue. The outcome
has been neither political philosophy nor political understanding but the
conquest of politics by philosophy.”
“Pragmatism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics, to name a few, have all
assiduously nourished an understanding of the political that does not
reflexively assume that the political is to be subsumed under or reconstructed
as the philosophical, or that philosophy can thrive by conquering politics and
reducing it to a problem in epistemology" (Barber, 1988, 4).
As Barber notes, there is something ironic in a pragmatic stance on
politics, since so many of the best known pragmatists, including Pierce,
James and Mead have been notably apolitical in their writings. The same
might be said of the best-known phenomenologists and hermeneuticists. In
fact, among this group, only John Dewey has had much to say about matters
political, although more recently, Richard Rorty appears to be attempting to
address some of these issues, and a variety of Europeans, including Jurgen
Habermas have been influenced by the American pragmatists.
In any event, following Barber, my intent in this paper, as in the
classroom, is to harness the insights of political philosophy without losing
touch with the fundamentally practical concerns of social policy. To
paraphrase Karl Marx’s famous dictum: The key reason for striving to
understand the world is to enhance our chances of improving it.

The Crisis in Social Liberalism1
The crisis in social liberalism referred to in my title is the crisis in
liberalism – a subject which has been a standard topic of social science and
political theory discussions since long before I first became aware of it as a
high school student in the late 1950’s. As closely as I can define it, the crisis
In this paper, I mean the terms liberalism, social liberalism and New Deal
liberalism interchangeably in their conventional American usages, which
differ diametrically from European uses, where the term neo-liberalism has
roughly the same meanings as the U.S. terms conservatism, neoconservatism and, more recently connote populism tinged with
authoritarianism (Dean, 1996), nativism, fear of strangers and racism.
1
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refers to our inability to agree upon a stable public philosophy which
adequately reconciles the rights and prerogatives of the individual and the
public good of the community in some lasting and intellectually satisfactory
way.
The implications of the crisis in liberalism for social policy are many and
profound. In most general terms, so long as the crisis exists, solutions to
social problems will always be tentative and provisional, and subject to
unraveling at any time. The recently controversial nature of such seeming
sacred policy cows as public education, freedom of speech, and social security
– as well as such never-settled matters as mental health, poverty and social
services – should be very instructive. In this unstable environment, achieving
a social policy solution may be only the minor half of the problem. In the long
run, maintaining the institutional legitimacy and efficacy of particular
solutions-in-place may require substantially greater time, energy, resources
and commitment. Thus, any social worker interested in social change should
have more than a little interest in the crisis in liberalism.
What is the nature of the crisis in liberalism? Barber quotes Rousseau
(The Social Contract, Book 1, Chapter 6, p. 12) as follows: “The problem is to
find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole
common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each,
while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as
free as before.” The absence of such an integrated solution can be expected to
yield coercion by the state and/or alienation of the individual.
The awareness of the liberal crisis arose during the first years of the 19th
century in the European (primarily German) reaction to Adam Smith’s
political economics and, somewhat more generally utilitarianism. Most of 19th
century social science, politics and social movements can be read as a
reaction to this crisis: Corporatism, German social liberalism, utopianism,
American civic republicanism, social Darwinism and socialism (including
such important variants as Marxism, trade unionism, anarcho-syndicalism
and Fabianism) to name just a select few. But these also, to date, have proved
to be as unsatisfactory as the liberal individualism they challenged. As
frequently as not, political philosophies stultify and confuse, while the
practice – rather than producing harmony and community – opens new
arenas for discord and dissension.
Social work has its own particular history of relating to the crisis of
liberalism. The particular set of solutions posed by Jane Addams and the
settlement house movement were at least as much about coping with the
crisis of liberalism as they were about founding and institutionalizing a
particular social service strategy (the neighborhood or community center).
For much of this century it appeared, at least to progressive American
eyes, that objective social science offered the intellectual solution to the
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liberal crisis and that a gradualist, or incremental, welfare state under the
benevolent watchful eyes of a new class of disinterested public professionals
(including social workers, public administrators, public health professionals
and others) posed the best practical solution. Ideology was allegedly
banished. Laissez-faire was consigned to a benighted past. Collectivisms of
the more dangerous and threatening type (National socialism, Fascism,
Stalinism, Maoism) were either defeated in the second world war or
contained within the second world behind an “iron curtain”. Politics, if not
exactly banished from the modern world, could at least be isolated from the
more serious and socially productive activities of civics and administration.
Then, what should have been the moment of triumph which John Kenneth
Galbraith once called The Liberal Hour (1960) gave way to increasing
disillusionment and malaise with government. Incrementally dismantling the
welfare state (now relabeled bloated bureaucracy) became a centerpiece for
what remains of the public purpose. Just a few short years after Daniel Bell
tolled The End of Ideology and Sheldon Wolin and Isaiah Berlin proclaimed
the death of political philosophy, both ideology and philosophy have returned
with a vengeance (Bell, 1962; Berlin, 1997; Wolin, 1960).
As Barber notes, “This is the liberal challenge: to accommodate conflict
and ameliorate competition without surrendering individuality, to employ
power in the service of liberty, to contain the aggressiveness that issues out of
man's individuality without destroying the liberty that is individuality's chief
virtue, to accommodate the requirements of order and legality and yet remain
as 'free as before'” (Barber, 1988, 27-28).
Politics has been defined as many things – the art of the possible, and so
on. Benjamin Barber’s approach is, in my view, particularly helpful because
he focuses on the epistemological – the nature of political knowledge –
without falling victim to the spectator view. He is worth quoting in full on
this matter, and I have done so in the footnotes of this paper, even though I
will only summarize the full quote here.2
2

"To speak of the autonomy of the political is in fact to speak of the sovereignty of the political. For by
sovereignty is meant not merely the dominion of the state over other forms of association, but the dominion
of politically adjudicated knowledge, under conditions of epistemological uncertainty, over other forms of
knowledge. To be sure, this sovereignty over knowledge is wholly residual: It comes into play only with
the breakdown of ordinary cognitive consensus, and only where such public judgment is required by the
need for common action. Where knowledge can prove itself certain, or at least where consensus is for the
time being undisputed (as in the case of mainstream science, for example), or where the absence of
consensus has no impact on public action (as in matters of private taste, for example), the political domain
claims no sovereignty. But where scientists disagree on the public outcomes of experimental technologies
(genetic engineering, for example), or where matters of taste are seen to have public consequences (the
design of a national flag, for example), or where theoretical inquiry raises issues of common import (the
dividing line between a fetus and a legal person, for example), the political realm necessarily becomes
sovereign over the contested realms of science and taste and inquiry in which such disputes are ordinarily
conducted. For at this point science, taste and theoretical inquiry are reduced to opinion (doxa ), and it is
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The realm of political knowledge, in Barber’s sense, boils down to two
principle criteria which we might call uncertainty and publicity. Is the matter
at issue a question of settled scientific, legal or religious certainty? Or, is it
an uncertainty (a matter of opinion)? As an example, members of the Flat
Earth society may believe what they wishes without discernable political
consequence. The fact that the earth is not flat has been settled to the
satisfaction of most of the public by satellite photos and belief that it is not
tends primarily to marginalize and trivialize their political position.
In at least some cases, the same result arises from a body of settled law.
For example, one factor which must constrain all current abortion debate is
the fact that the issue of whether abortions are constitutional has been
settled until further notice. Contestants may acknowledge this as political
fact, ignore it, or wish that it were not so, but they may not wish it away. It
remains one of the certainties of the situation.
The second factor characterizing the realm of the political is publicity , (in
its original meaning of public-ness and not its current meaning of selfadvertisement). Genuinely political matters are matters affecting, or of
concern to, us all. Thus, the sordid private details of private lives being
played out in Washington in recent years are public in so far as they impact
upon the ability of the government to function.
The recent effects of all this on social work – what might be termed its
crisis of public posture – have been disenchanting in the extreme: A
profession which once prided itself on its public presence has been reduced to
one more special pleader in a polity given over entirely to interest group
bargaining. And, social policy teaching which had been directed at preserving
and extending social citizenship and ways of discovering and attaining the
public good has been increasingly directed at how to get – or keep – ‘our
share’ of the public pie. We have, to some degree, become those very seekers
after the spoils of government our professional ancestors warned us about!
Not yet well chronicled, but morally dispiriting to anyone of conscience is
the rise of special pleading as the principle public posture of the social work
profession. Announcements to the effect that “client benefits were lost but
third party payments were saved” have become altogether too commonplace.
Just this past month, many of us received an email message proclaiming as
“A Great Victory” the temporary halting (for two years) of a measure to stop
Medicaid payments for social work services in nursing homes. Can anyone
over opinion that sovereignty, defined by public judgment, necessarily holds sway, albeit only by default."
(14-15)
He summarizes thus:
"This lesson about the nature of political sovereignty can be reduced to a single priority rule:
Whenever private theorists disagree on matters of public import, then the normal epistemological priority
of truth over opinion is over-ridden and reversed in favor of the political priority of public over private."
(15)
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seriously believe that postponing this initiative for two years was a truly
great victory? Do you believe that two years from now, there will not be
another (and probably more successful) elimination attempt?
At the present moment the social work profession has no greater special
purpose or public role than tobacco farmers, or the liquor lobby and
considerably less than arms merchants. The crisis of liberalism has reduced
us to just another set of special pleaders. And, only through recovering a
workable public philosophy which will serve as a resource in the public arena
is it likely that social work can recover an adequate moral and political basis
for effective social policy. Those who believe that the current politics of
special interest sufficiently serve the needs of our clients and the best
interests of the profession will, of course, take issue with me on this.

Social Policy
The other major term in my title is social policy, by which I mean to
address several things in this paper. First, given the focus of this conference,
I mean to address the subject matter currently taught under that heading in
schools of social work. The present social policy paradigm in social work
education is a rather peculiar and unstable mixture of vocationalism and
liberal learning forged during the 1960’s. It arose out of a curious amalgam of
English post-war welfare state thinking (e.g., Marshall, Titmuss, Donison),
legal scholars (e.g., Charles Schottland), community and urban sociology (e.g.,
Freeman & Jones, Warren, Moynihan) modernization theory (e.g., Wilensky
and LeBeaux), social planning (e.g., Morris, Kahn, ) and a patina of pluralist
political theory (Dahl) and institutional economics (e.g., Galbraith, Myrdal).
Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s noted essay, “The Professionalization of
Reform” , provides a fairly complete capsule summary of the assumptions and
world view of what might be termed the Policy Profession movement.
(Moynihan, 1965) The journal in which Moynihan’s essay was first published,
Public Interest, along with Transaction Press’ journal Society together served
as the publications branch of a loosely-coupled network which also included
academic social scientists, upper-level federal bureaucrats and congressional
staff members, a few key Congressional patrons and a growing national
network of nonprofit and university-based centers and institutes.
Social work was late to join the movement and, it would appear, equally
late in letting go. Through the mediation of key centers, in particular the
Heller School at Brandeis University, the assumptions and expectations of
the policy professional movement gradually came to play a defining role in
shifting the social work policy paradigm away from an earlier view
represented by the table in Appendix C.
The political fortunes of the policy professional movement have been in
decline for some time now. Like other aspects of “the liberal establishment” in
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public life, they have given way to the advancing conservative juggernaut.
The sections of Patrick Moynihan’s book, Miles to Go: A Personal History of
Social Policy devoted to discussing his “Professionalization. . .” essay and the
Public Interest read like a eulogy of that movement (Moynihan, 1996). Social
work education, however, appears to be having great difficulty in letting go.
Denial, it seems, can be as pervasive and difficult to acknowledge in the
death of movements as in the death of persons.
The policy professional paradigm in social work education is reinforced by
the current CSWE policy standard M6.10 (shown in Appendix A) which was
changed only slightly from the earlier standard 7.10 (shown in Appendix B),
which in turn replaced an earlier, and much more detailed specification built
around the older, but still familiar Needs and Resources model (shown in
Appendix C). It is important to note, therefore, that the standard itself is
ambiguous in its coverage: allowing both the policy professionals paradigm
and alternatives such as the one endorsed in this paper.
Early adherents of the professional policy paradigm forthrightly
acknowledged the lack of a sufficient theoretical basis for the American
welfare state (e.g., see the papers in Schottland, 1967). More recent sources
have generally dispensed with the theoretical caveats and qualifiers,
although it is uncertain that any of the underlying theoretical problems of
welfare state theory as a particular solution to the liberal crisis have been
resolved. We all have come to banter about the American welfare state when
it is still not clear what, exactly, a welfare state is and whether in fact in
America we have one. There is a gigantic body of opinion on the subject, but
the issue itself remains political in that it is anything but a scientific
certainty.
The present social policy paradigm in social work education as I
understand it appears intended to create informed professionals able to act as
bureaucratic (and to a lesser extent, legislative and judicial) change agents
within the broad scheme of contemporary interest-group liberalism. That is,
professionals capable of engaging in policy practice that recognizes and acts
upon the complex of legislation, court rulings, administrative law and
regulations, policy bulletins and other policy paraphernalia.
A somewhat broader and more diffuse secondary educational objective
(which is covered by the liberal arts emphasis in the standards) is
compensating for the weaknesses and deficiencies in our student’s civic
education and awareness, regarding the history, philosophy, sociology and
economics of American public life and government. Almost all of my concerns
in this paper fall under this second category.
The present social policy paradigm in social work education as I read it
also fosters an epistemology much like the philosophical posturing criticized
by Barber above, except that it is the “certain truths” of social science, rather
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than philosophy (or established religion) for which claim to a privileged
epistemological position is made. The formula is a simple one, reaching back
to the charity organization society investigations of the last century: Certain
knowledge of the causes and etiologies of contemporary social problems
should yield both a correct public understanding of the problem and detailed
awareness of what to do about solving it. In the liberal progressive state of
20th century America, such certainties should entitle the profession to the
privileged status of experts in the policy process. (More will be said on this in
a moment.)
My thesis in this paper is that the current priority ordering of the two
objectives of social policy teaching – call them the policy practice objective
and the civic objective – need to be reversed, and that new and expanded
attention needs to be paid to the civic, or citizenship roles of social work
professionals. We (that is, various bodies of technical experts in social work)
believe that we already know enough to solve most social problems: The
problem is they (that is, the non-expert rest of the citizenry) either don’t
know that we know, or don’t accept our knowledge! The challenge is
translating that knowledge politically into viable policy within the terms of
Barber’s sense of politics (that is, through dialectic and dialogue with those
who do not share the certainty) without violating Rousseau’s constraint. If
the opposition is simply overwhelmed (which is extremely unlikely at the
current moment) the result will be further alienation and the cycle will begin
anew. If the opposition is successful, the status quo (which includes unsolved
social problems) remains in place.
The crisis of liberalism as it impacts upon social policy making is not
tactical; the answer is not merely discovering and employing the right
methods. The problem is political in the deepest sense of that term. Thus, the
profession of social work needs to rediscover the commitments to real
democratic politics – and particularly dialectics and dialogue.

Getting Out in Public
To explore these ideas further, I would like to use as a departure point
certain disagreements with a number of particular points raised by Robert
Fisher and Howard Karger in their recent book, Social Work and Community
in a Private World: Getting Out in Public (Fisher & Karger, 1997)
Consistent with my argument, the nature of my disagreement is neither
scientific nor professional. My disagreement is a purely political one, over
the best course of collective action. As I understand the part of their
argument which relates most directly to social policy teaching, social work is
(or could be) a progressive “vanguard” profession capable of providing
leadership in comprehensive social improvement through public sector
reform, and that we as social policy instructors should concentrate on
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improving our students tactical understanding, political skills and supplying
them with the correct ideology.
My argument as already stated, social work is not currently capable of
embracing that vanguard role but I agree that it should be in the future. My
principle disagreements are over how to define such a vanguard role for social
workers and how to prepare students for it. My argument is not with Fisher
and Karger as individuals; I take them to be giving voice to the consensus
policy paradigm referred to above.
According to them, “When focused on social change, social work education
can be an excellent means for (1) acquiring or further developing a broad and
critical understanding of the public sphere that influences almost all aspects
of daily life, (2) tying this contextualization to specific skills and work, and (3)
developing an ideology steeped in critical analysis, values and theory. Taken
together, these factors can turn social workers into social change agents –
drum majors for social justice – and turn social work education into education
for social change.” (xii) I agree, it could be an excellent means, but currently
is not; students do not presently have the requisite skills, nor suitable
ideologies nor the requisite analytical skills.
The conventional liberal dichotomy between private and public social
worlds which Fisher and Karger use as their departure point is unnecessarily
limiting, as I have argued elsewhere (Lohmann, 1992). There is a large and
rapidly growing intermediate world of voluntary association and collective
action between private and public which I choose to call the common whose
historic role has been to serve as a staging area for creation of precisely the
kind of public life Fisher and Karger call for. Yet, the social policy paradigm
in social work barely recognizes this third space at all. Social workers once
excelled in the common arenas of small groups, community organizations,
social movements and voluntary associations. While devolution is bringing
these “voluntary sectors” back into the forefront of social action, it is not at all
clear that the social work profession will play any role in these developments,
much less the kind of vanguard role Fisher and Karger envision.
At the same time, the conventional distinction they make between
progressive and conservative public goods is outdated and masks the real
distinctions which have been driving U.S., and to an extent first-world
politics in general, for several decades now. This difficulty is best illustrated
by examining their contrast of progressive public goods with conservative
ones. A progressive public good is said to be “inclusive, democratic and
equalitarian” while a conservative public good is said to be “exclusive,
dominated by hierarchical institutional and corporate oligarchies and vastly
unequal.” (xiii) It is simply misguided to make such facile generalizations
about anything as multi-dimensional as contemporary conservatism.
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If this distinction is held, for example, one must ask in the words of the
old labor song which side social work is currently on, since a great deal of
social policy action by the profession is clearly directed at protecting the
exclusive prerogatives of the profession, and at reinforcing hierarchical
institutional and corporate oligarchies and inequalities. Indeed, in a world in
which social workers strive to hold onto some rudiments of the welfare state
and appear to all the world to have no realistic program of proposed changes,
while radical fundamentalists have an increasingly clear and pointed
program of social change, is not the desire to hold onto the outdated
liberal/conservative dichotomy of the past itself evidence of precisely this sort
of conservative public good?
It is not my intent, however, to defend the claim that social work is a
conservative (or for that matter, a liberal) profession. Rather, I wish to assert
that attempts to cast the social politics of the current period in the familiar
terms of ideological opposition between New Deal liberals and conservative
defenders of the old order, or status quo ante are misguided and seriously
wide of the mark. At the very least, the problem is one of conflict, as Lowi
suggests, between two liberalisms and two conservatisms (Lowi, 1995). In my
view, the dichotomy itself should not be sustained, for reasons I will now lay
out.
The first reason is that, somewhat paradoxically, what we mean by the
term conservative has changed dramatically in recent years. For one thing, as
the previous example suggests, conserving and protecting the gains of the
recent past has placed social work in an entirely different posture than it was
in 30 years ago.
Further, the level of conservative discourse has risen considerably from
the days when conservative was frequently a synonym for segregationist on
the one hand, and “old order know-nothing” on the other. As recently as the
1950’s, conservatism was so insignificant in American public life that Lionel
Trilling could claim that there were no true conservative ideas in our culture,
only “irritable mental gestures which seek to resemble ideas.” Recent
grouchy, jingoistic screeds like those by Oliver North, Pat Buchanan, and
Phyllis Schlafly (to name but three) certainly show that there is more than
ample contemporary representation of this same genre, but then the New
Left has generated a comparable amount of such flummery.
However, anyone who has seriously encountered conservative writers like
Robert Bork knows that while the irritability is still present, the level of
conservative discourse has risen considerably in recent decades. Indeed,
continuing to equate the arguments of first-rate conservative thinkers like
Frederick Hayek, Robert Nozick, Leo Strauss, or Michael Oakeshott with the
anti-intellectual ‘no-nothing’ conservatism Trilling was referring to is an
error of the first order (Barber, 1988; Barry, 1979; Nozick, 1974; Cropsey &
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Strauss, 1964). Yet it is one that is committed in social work policy
classrooms routinely every semester.3
Any social policy instructor who believes that a simple distinction between
social workers and conservatives will hold up today simply hasn’t listened to
their students recently! I find that the Vandals have entered the gates, and
that for every outspokenly “liberal” student I have today, I have an equally
outspoken “conservative” student, and sometimes two. The vast majority of
my students, I might add, abhor ideological conflict of any kind and appear to
wish to remain resolutely uncommitted at any cost!
The meaning of conservative has changed in other ways as well. For
example, many recent actions endorsed by so-called “conservatives” are not
“conservative” at all in any meaningful sense of that term. The recent change
in family life endorsed by the Baptist convention’s advocacy of the
subordinate role of wives would constitute one of the most revolutionary
shifts in family life since the Bolshevik attempts to eliminate the family
during the 1920’s. And it is similarly ideologically motivated (in this case,
unfortunately, by a rather shallow ideology which labels television family life
during the 1950’s as “traditional”).
On the misguided ideological assumption that “we” (e.g., social workers)
are all liberals and progressives and “they” (e.g., conservatives) are all wrong,
My final reason for wishing to get past the liberal-conservative dichotomy
bears directly on the teaching of social policy. Opinion polls continue to
regularly support the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that while “liberal”
political candidates and ideology are unacceptable to the majority of
Americans at present, a good many liberal social policies continue to receive
high approval ratings (particularly when they are not labeled as liberal).
This leads me to the conclusion that continuing to emphasize “insider
strategies” of the professionalization of reform directed at bureaucratic offices
and legislative corridors is unlikely to produce much more in the way of
positive social policy results than it has in the past 30 years. If present trends
continue, at the very most it will protect what we currently have or minimize
our losses.
I would, instead advocate social policy courses built on an outsider
strategy and recognizing such forces as the adverse ideological shifts in public
life and devolution. Such courses would emphasize public education,
citizenship, civic involvement and participation and community action.

Historical note (2019): Arguably, this more intellectual conservatism apparently ran out of steam
somewhere in the decade after this paper was first presented. It has been largely replaced by the
“unconscionable conservatism” of Donald Trump, Dick Cheney, and Mitch McConnell, et. al., that
John Dean (2006) later analyzed.
3
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A New Social Policy Course
For the past three years, I have been experimenting with a restructured
masters-level policy course which seeks, in various ways to build upon some
of the ideas presented in this paper: Engagement with contemporary currents
in political philosophy, a pragmatic political epistemology (ala Barber), and a
policy analysis which emphasizes dialectic and dialogue among fellowcitizens rather than merely professional elites.
The recently-reaccredited curriculum at the West Virginia University
School of Social Work features a social policy continuum of four courses: two
required BSW social policy courses, with one MSW social policy course
required only of regular (non-advanced standing) students and one social
policy course required of all graduate (regular and advanced standing)
students. In our curriculum design, the two undergraduate courses are
expected to address the liberal arts perspective, professional foundation
(especially cultural heritage, critical thinking, history and philosophy), values
and ethics, diversity, social and economic justice, policy and services,
oppression/discrimination standards. Social welfare history is the central
thrust of the first course, and policy influence and policy formation processes
are the organizing framework for the second.
The first graduate course addresses both history and policy processes in a
single semester. Which brings us to the second graduate course: For more
than two decades, the focus in the second graduate policy course in our
curriculum was on policy analysis methodology falling broadly within the
parameters of the professional policy paradigm discussed previously.
Despite tremendous progress in the past two decades, West Virginia is
still a small rural state with a very limited and traditional state government.
In this context, practically no graduates were observed entering policy
positions of the type this course allegedly prepared them for in the past 20
years. If you set the bar low enough, of course, this statement can be shown
to be demonstrably false. Most of our students do vote, and some write at
least occasional letters to Congress. Students interested in entering private
practice and micro-practice had genuine difficulty seeing any relevance and
saw policy mostly as a necessary hurdle.
All of this, however, was not enough to push me into the revisions of our
second policy course which I am about to describe. The thing which finally
pushed me over the edge was a push/pull: The pull came from my growing
sense of intellectual excitement at the large body of work occurring in the
new political philosophy which has grown up in the wake of John Rawls
Theory of Justice and my growing sense of frustration at being unable to
share this with students. The push came from the incredible rise of incivility
a few years ago associated with the birth of the militia movements, and the
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efforts by several liberals I know to paint all conservatives as potential
abortion doctor-killers and federal building-bombers.
The general outlines of the course are relatively simple to describe:
Students are expected to read widely, think deeply, write expansively, talk
intelligently and listen closely to others. Above all else, I have sought to
plunge students directly into the ideological streams of contemporary
political debate and political philosophy bearing on social policy, and to
encourage them to confront and seek accommodation and accord with their
fellow citizens over what to do about social problems.
Rather than textbooks or other pre-digested approaches to standardized
or codified knowledge, students in this course are fed a steady diet of political
rhetoric. A reasonable knowledge of social welfare history and policyprocesses, as taught in the earlier courses in our curriculum is assumed, prerequisite knowledge for this course. Step one each semester is to clarify the
distinction between knowledge and opinion, along the lines laid out by Barber
and discussed previously in this paper.
One semester, when I co-taught the course for a large class of part-time
students in our off-campus program, the rhetoric came through the use of
dozens and dozens of op-ed editorial columns. This past semester, groups of
students explored the internet as a source of political knowledge, gathering
on-line newspaper op-eds, position papers by various associations and
interest groups, and sampling some of that marvelous inventory of lone-wolf
journalism which has given a radical new populist meaning to First
Amendment freedoms.
For several semesters, at least one and as many as four current, polemical
books serve as designated class texts for discussion and debate. Monographs
by Theodore Lowi, (1995), Robert Bork, (1996) and Michael Sandel (1996) a
collection of conservative writings edited by David Brooks, (1995) and a really
neat history of the Great Society by Irwin Unger (1996). Like the use of
similar works by John Kenneth Galbraith, Gunnar Myrdal, Milton
Friedman, et. al., in policy courses when the policy professional paradigm
was still in formation, my interest is neither in presenting ideology nor
forming orthodoxy. I am interested in initiating students into the streams of
current discussion and debate. Next spring, I expect to use Moynihan’s Miles
to Go. . . and at least one other as-yet-undecided work.
This past semester, I had roughly 90 students in two sections of the course
– too many, in my view, to make for meaningful class discussion, so I chose a
somewhat different path. Prior to the course, I was able to identify
approximately 140 mostly recent (i.e., published in the past two years) works
that I thought suitable. Each student selected a unique book from the list and
prepared a written and oral book reviews. Written book reviews were
submitted to a special electronic forum where they were available to be read
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by others in the class. They are still available to students over the summer.
Students reviewed a recent work on Josiah Royce’s idealistic philosophy of
community, Rawls’ theory of justice and the 1920’s debate between John
Dewey-Walter Lippman debate over the nature of the public, and a student
who had been an undergraduate philosophy major even took on Jurgen
Habermas’ recent dauntingly complex work.
I wish I could tell you that each and every student came away with an
expanded political consciousness and deeper awareness of the current policy
milieu, but I cannot. I can tell you that these book reviews provoked enough
breakthroughs and moments of enlightenment about the nature and
purposes of political dialogue and the inevitably political nature of social
policy making to more than justify the effort. And, in one of the most amazing
cases of selection bias I’ve ever witnessed, those students who took on the
most difficult books generally did the best reports.
Another element of the course designed to further discussion is a coursespecific email discussion list. All students are expected to activate their
student email accounts (or use their private or pre-existing accounts) and
register for the discussion list (SW333-L). Each student is expected to
generate at least one thought-provoking memo for the class.
One of the highlights of the course for several years was what I called
policy fairs which were held in conjunction with some larger school event,
most typically a semi-annual field instructors meeting. Arrangements are
made for a large exhibition space and students are encouraged to work in
small groups to prepare exhibits of an educational or advocacy nature on a
particular social policy issue or question.
During one particularly successful semester, students in both sections
worked together on the common theme of Violence. Through some
outstanding student efforts and leadership, this particular half-day policy
exposition featured six outside speakers (several of whom agreed to waive
their usual speaking fees), original art work for posters and buttons, a
demonstration in self-defense, an original one-act play written and directed
by one of the students with volunteer actors from the theater department and
coverage on the local evening television news. Unfortunately, this session was
not done in conjunction with another event, and the students were less
successful at attracting an audience than the television coverage, so
attendance was limited almost exclusively to students in the class.
Another central feature of the course is the use of what I have called
policy salons: Each student is expected to plan, organize and carry out a
number of such salons, which can be small discussion groups at home or in a
church or community organizational setting, or large, community. As with
the books, I am still experimenting with the optimum number of salons to
require. One is too few and five is too many.
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Since I typically have two sections of this course going at the same time in
a particular semester, I have also experimented with cooperation between the
two sections, generally asking them to create between them, a public (much
like the public arising from the several 18th century London coffee houses
which was the subject of a much cited book by Jurgen Habermas.) This effort
has had decidedly mixed results. These students turn out to be remarkably
reluctant to engage in what they perceive as an extra-curricular activity, and
efforts to create more formal coordination mechanisms have been notably
unsuccessful. On more than one occasion, students have felt that I am
attempting to pit them against one another or play them against one another.
Many of the students do appear to get the point however: Meaningful
coordination is very hard work!
On the whole, I have been pleased with the results to date of these efforts
and intend to continue to try to elaborate my version of a new social policy
paradigm
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Appendix A
M6.0 Master’s Curriculum Content
Social Welfare Policy and Services

M6.10 The foundation social welfare policy and services content must include
the history, mission, and philosophy of the social work profession. Content
must be presented about the history and current patterns of provision of
social welfare services, the role of social policy in helping or deterring people
in the maintenance or attainment of optimal health and well-being, and the
effect of policy on social work practice. Students must be taught to analyze
current social policy within the context of historical and contemporary factors
that shape policy. Content must be presented about the political and
organizational processes used to influence policy, the process of policy
formation, and the frameworks for analyzing social policies in light of
principles of social and economic justice.
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Appendix B
Curriculum Policy Statement 7.10 (1991)

The major aims of study in this area are to prepare professionals to function
as informed and competent practitioners in providing services and as
knowledgeable and committed participants in efforts to achieve change in
social policies and programs. Students are expected to develop skills in the
use and application of scientific knowledge to the analysis and development
of social welfare policy and services. They should know the structure of
service programs and the history of the organized profession and other social
welfare institutions. Social work students should also gain an understanding
of political process and the means to further the achievement of social work
goals and purposes.
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Appendix C
CONTENT AREAS IN WHICH
BEHAVIORS ARE TO BE

BEHAVIORS TO BE

DEVELOPED BY THE
STUDENT

DEVELOPED BY STUDENT

Knowledge
Understanding
Assessment Skill
Interpretation
Skill
Scientific
Viewpoint
Social
Viewpoint
Prof.
Viewpoin
t
A. PROBLEM
1. as manifest need

X

X

2. as person-centered

X

X

3. as universal, yet singular

X

X

X

X

X

X

4. as cause and consequence

X

5. as institutional lack or
dysfunction

X

6. as challenge and opportunity

X

X

7. as requiring a service solution

X

X

8. as requiring social work help

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X

B. POLICY
9. as social commitment

19
10. as social movement

X

X

11. as planned social change

X

12. as manifesting the desirable

X

13. as manifesting the possible

X

14. as posing social issues

X

X

X

15. as social action

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

C. PROVISION
16. as mobilized resources of
society

X

X

X

17. as organized in a social
agency

X

X

X

18. as client-centered service

X

X

X

19. as teamwork

X

20. as geared to serving the total
community

X

X
X

X
X
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